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Wednesday, February 16, 2011

Health and Family Welfare in India:Incorporating the Mid-term Appraisal of Eleventh Five Year Plan

CSE-2011/GENERAL STUDIES(PRELIMS)/PROF. S.M/HAND OUT #7
Health: Eleventh Plan Vision
 Health as a right for all citizens is the goal that the Plan will strive towards.
 A comprehensive approach that encompasses individual health care, public health, sanitation, clean drinking water, access to food, and knowledge of hygiene, and feeding practices.
 To transform public health care into an accountable, accessible, and affordable system of quality services.
 Convergence and development of public health systems and services that are responsive to the health needs and aspirations of the people.
 Public provisioning of quality health care to enable access to affordable and reliable heath services, especially in the context of preventing the non-poor from entering into poverty or in terms of reducing the suffering of those who are already below the poverty line.
 Reducing disparities in health across regions and communities by ensuring access to affordable health care.
 Good governance, transparency, and accountability in the delivery of health services that is ensured through involvement of Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRI)s, community, and civil society groups.

Health: Eleventh Plan Goals
 To raise public spending on health from 0.9 per cent of GDP to 2-3 per cent of GDP, with improved arrangement for community financing and risk pooling.
 To undertake architectural correction of the health system to enable it to effectively handle increased allocations and promote policies that strengthen public health management and service delivery in the country.
 Reduction in child and maternal mortality.
 Universal access to public services for food and nutrition, sanitation and hygiene.
 Universal access to public health care services, integrated comprehensive primary health care, with emphasis on services addressing women’s and children’s health and universal immunization.
 Prevention and control of communicable and non-communicable diseases, including locally endemic diseases.
 Population stabilization, gender and demographic balance.
 Revitalize local health traditions and mainstream AYUSH.
 Promotion of healthy lifestyles.

Health: Eleventh Plan Objectives
 Reducing Maternal Mortality Ratio (MMR) to 1 per 1,000 live births.
 Reducing Infant Mortality Rate (IMR) to 28 per 1,000 live births.
 Reducing Total Fertility Rate (TFR) to 2.1.
 Providing clean drinking water for all by 2009 and ensuring no slip-backs.
 Reducing malnutrition among children in the age group 0–3 year to half its present level.
 Reducing anaemia among women and girls by 50 per cent.
 Raising the sex ratio in the age group 0–6 years to 935 by 2011–12, and to 950 by 2016–17.
 Malaria Mortality Reduction Rate: 50 per cent up to 2010, additional 10 per cent by 2012.
 Kala Azar Mortality Reduction Rate: 100 per cent by 2010 and sustaining elimination until 2012.
 Filaria / Microfilaria Reduction Rate: 70 per cent by 2010, 80 per cent by 2012 and elimination by 2015.
 Dengue Mortality Reduction Rate: 50 per cent by 2010 and sustaining at that level until 2012.
 Cataract operations: Increase to 46 lakhs by 2012.
 Leprosy Prevalence Rate: Reduce from 1.8 per 10,000 in 2005 to less that 1 per 10,000 thereafter.
 Tuberculosis DOTS series: Maintain 85 per cent cure rate through entire mission period and also sustain planned case detection rate.
In terms of systems improvements the NRHM targets were:
 Upgrade all PHCs into 24x7 PHCs by the year 2010.
 Upgrading all Community Health Centres to Indian Public Health Standards.
 Increase utilization of first referral units from bed occupancy by referred cases of less than 20 per cent to over 75 per cent.
 Engaging 4,00,000 female Accredited Social Health Activists (ASHAs).







Maternal Mortality Ratio (MMR)
To reach the MMR target of 100 by 2012, the required rate of decline from 254 (SRS 2004-06) has to be, on an average, 22 per year. Unfortunately, no data are available on the progress of MMR during the Eleventh Plan period i.e. the period beginning 2007-08. However, earlier data shows that MMR came down from 301 (SRS 2001-03) to 254 (SRS 2004-06), i.e., an average decline of 16 per year. Achieving the Eleventh Plan target clearly requires much faster progress. State wise decline during the pre-Eleventh Plan period varied from an average of 26 per year for Uttar Pradesh/Uttarakhand, 20 per year for Bihar/Jharkhand, 19 per year for Rajasthan, 18 per year for Orissa/ West Bengal to 15 per year for Madhya Pradesh/Chhattisgarh.
When 52.2 per cent of the deliveries are conducted at home (DLHS-3, 2007-8) and comprehensive obstetric care continues to be a problem in many States, the scope for expanding timely access to quality institutional care is limited, particularly for those living in remote and inaccessible areas. In such a scenario, the MMR goal of 100 is achievable only through appropriate area specific interventions.
Infant Mortality Rate (IMR)
Although IMR is showing a downward trend, but the rate of improvement here too has to be three times that in the past so as to attain the level expected by the end of Eleventh Plan. All India IMR was 57 in 2006 and 53 in 2008 (SRS), a decrease of 4 in two years. High focus States of NRHM have shown marginally better performance in rural areas, where IMR has decreased by 5 in two years. Tamil Nadu has also shown marginally better performance, a decline of 6 in two years. To achieve IMR of 28 by 2012, the required rate of decrease has to be an average of 6 per year. Intensive and urgent efforts are required to adopt homebased newborn care based on validated models such as the Gadchiroli model and make focused efforts for encouraging breast feeding and safe infant and child feeding practices. While emphasis on early breast feeding is part of ASHAs training, special training on neonatal care for community and facility level health functionaries will facilitate a faster reduction in IMR.




HOME BASED NEWBORN CARE (HBNC)
 Efforts to improve home based care have proven successful at improving child survival. Home Based Newborn and Child Care is to be provided by a trained Community Health Worker (such as the ASHA) who guides and supports the mother, family, and TBA in the care of newborn, and attends the newborn at home if she is sick. The worker is supervised by a field person (ANM/LHV or a doctor) who visits the community once in 15 days. Community acceptance and coverage of such care has been quite good.
 The GoI approved the implementation of HBNC based on the Gadchiroli model, where appreciable decline in IMR has been documented on the basis of work done by a VO called SEARCH. Gadchiroli has shown how ordinary women can do extraordinary things: a well-trained local woman can not only lower neonatal mortality but can also bring about attitudinal change. The women Shishu Rakshaks of Gadchiroli have managed to dispel many myths surrounding pregnancy and have been able to ensure better nutrition, care, immunization, and hygiene.
 The national strategy during the Plan will be to introduce and make available high-quality HBNC services in all districts/areas with an IMR more than 45 per 1000 live births. Apart from performance incentive to ASHAs, an award will be given to ASHAs and village community if no mother–newborn or child death is reported in a year.
National Rural Health Mission
• NRHM was launched on April 12, 2005, to provide accessible, affordable and accountable quality health services to the poorest households in the remotest rural regions. Allocation has been increased to Rs. 12,070 crore in interim budget for 2009-10 compared to Rs. 12,050 crore in 2008-09. NRHM is being operationalized throughout the country, with special focus on 18 states which includes 8 Empowered Action Group States (Bihar, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Orissa and Rajasthan), 8 NE states, Himachal Pradesh and Jammu & Kashmir.
• The main aim of NRHM is to provide accessible, affordable, accountable, effective and reliable primary health care facilities, especially, to the poor and vulnerable sections of the population. It also aims at bridging the gap in rural health care services through the creation of a cadre of Accredited Social Health Activists (ASHA) and improved hospital care, decentralization of programme to district level to improve intra and inter-sectoral convergence and effective utilization of resources. NRHM further aims to provide overarching umbrella to the existing programmes of health and family welfare including RCH-II, malaria, blindness, iodine deficiency, filaria, kala-azar, tuberculosis, leprosy and for integrated disease surveillance. Further, it addresses the issue of health in the context of sector-wide approach towards sanitation and hygiene, nutrition and safe drinking water as basic determinants of good health in order to have greater convergence among the related social sector departments i.e. AYUSH, Women & Child Development, Sanitation, Elementary Education, Panchayati Raj and Rural Development. The mission further seeks to buildgreater ownership of the programme among the community through involvement of Panchayati Raj Institutions, NGOs and other stakeholders at national, state, district and sub-district levels to achieve the goals of National Population Policy 2000 and National Health Policy. The expected outcomes of the mission include reduction of IMR to below 30/1000 live births, MMR to below 100/100,000 live births & TFR to 2.1 by 2012.
Performance of NRHM:

 7.49 lakh Accredited Social Health Activists (ASHAs) have been selected though the total number of those who have completed all training modules is low. Against the target of 6 lakh fully trained ASHAs by 2008 there are 5.19 lakh ASHAs positioned with drug kits, but their training is still to be completed. Only about 1.99 lakh ASHAs have completed all five modules and 5.65 lakh have completed up to fourth training module.
 4.51 lakh Village Health and Sanitation Committees (VHSCs) have been set up against the target of 6 lakh VHSCs by 2008. The operational effectiveness of the VHSCs, however, needs considerable improvement.
 40,426 Sub-centres (SCs) have been provided two ANMs against the target of 1.05 lakh SCs by 2009. 8,745 SCs are without even a single ANM.
 8,324 Primary Health Centres (PHCs) are functional on 24X7 basis and 5,907of them have three Staff Nurses against the target of 18,000 PHCs by 2009.
 3,966 Community Health Centres (CHCs) are functional on 24X7 basis. However, information regarding the target of strengthening 3250 CHCs with seven specialists and nine staff nurses by 2009 is not available. In any case, the number of CHCs/Sub-Divisional Hospitals or equivalent, which have been upgraded to First Referral Unit (FRU) has increased from 750 (as on 31 March 2005) to 1934 (as on 31 December 2009).
 510 out of total 578 District Hospitals (DHs) have been strengthened to act as FRUs.
 29,223 Rogi Kalyan Samitis (RKSs)/Hospital Development Committees have been constituted at PHC/CHC/DH levels against the target of 37,100 RKSs by 2009.
 State & District Societies are in place except at the State level in West Bengal. District Programme Managers and District Accounts Managers are in position in 581 and 579 districts respectively.
 356 Districts have operational Mobile Medical Units (MMUs) against the target of 600 MMUs by 2009 (one for each district). In addition, boat clinics in Assam & West Bengal, emergency transport system in Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Karnataka, Goa, Uttarakhand, Assam and Rajasthan, GPS enabled MMUs in Gujarat, Haryana and Tamil Nadu are operational.



Human Resources for Health
 Measures have been taken during the Eleventh Five Year Plan period to solve the problem of shortage of basic education infrastructure and human resources:.
 Ensure availability of medical professionals in rural areas on a permanent basis, posting of doctors with adequate monetary as well as non-monetary incentives, such as suitable accommodation, class I status, preferential school admissions for children of doctors living in remote areas, transfer or posting of choice after a stipulated length of stay and training opportunities.
 States to expand the pool of medical practitioners including a cadre of Licentiate Medical Practitioners and practitioners of Indian Systems of Medicine and Homeopathy (AYUSH).
 •Increase age of retirement of doctors (all Central and State Government including Defence, Railways, etc.) to 62 years. States will be encouraged to retain public health doctors on contract basis for further period of three years till the age of 65 years, especially in the notified hardship areas.
 • A series of one-year duration Certificate Courses for MBBS graduates will be launched in deficit disciplines like public health, anaesthesia, psychiatry, geriatric care, and oncology. The private sector will also be encouraged to participate

Qualitative Feedback of NRHM: Voices from the Field

Accredited Social Health Activists (ASHAs)

The appointment of locally recruited women as Accredited Social Health Activists (ASHAs) who would link potential beneficiaries with the health service system is an important element of the NRHM. The good part is that
7.49 lakh ASHAs have been appointed; but several issues still need to be resolved. Not only is there a lack of transparency in the selection, ASHAs are often inadequately trained. Besides, their only focus seems to be on facilitating institutional deliveries. The ASHA who accompanies the expectant mother faces considerable hardship because she has nowhere to stay for the duration of confinement as institutional accommodation facilities are non-existent. They also often experience long delays in payment of incentives.




Village Health and Nutrition Day (VHND)

An important activity of NRHM, Village Health and Nutrition Day is to promote regular community-oriented health and nutrition activities. The event is held on a fixed day every month to sensitise the community and is popularly known as ‘Tika Karan Divas’. However, implementation is ad-hoc in most villages of the high focus States. Surveys revealed that only a few pockets in some States like Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, West Bengal and Assam were aware of VHND. The other drawback of the programme was that it often restricted itself to immunisation and antenatal check up are done on the day. There is no nutrition education. To have the desired impact, VHNDs need to be implemented with the full intended content of activities and with regularity. This can be achieved through more active involvement of NGOs and community based organizations.

Janani Suraksha Yojana (JSY)

Launched to promote institutional deliveries, JSY provides cash incentive to expectant mothers who opt for institutional delivery. Poor women from the remote districts in Bihar, Orissa and other States are reported to be visiting institutions to avail JSY benefits. However, except for parts of Southern States, most public health institutions are not well equipped for conducting deliveries at the community or even at the block level. The beneficiaries are often asked to purchase gloves, syringes and medicines from the market. The general view, endorsed by visits to the field is that the health centres and subdivisional hospitals remain understaffed and are
poorly run and maintained. A very large number are unhygienic and incapable of catering to the patient load. Women who deliver at the health facility are discharged a few hours after delivery. Sometimes, deliveries take place on the way to the health facility or even outside the locked labour rooms. Lack of co-ordination and mutual understanding between the ANM and ASHA results in the suffering of pregnant women.

Maternal & Child Health

NRHM has been able to provide an extensive network of transport facilities in States that have established emergency transport systems. On the other hand, there is very little awareness about the Integrated Management of Neonatal and Childhood Illnesses (IMNCI) strategy. In the event of illness of either the mother or the neo-nate, RMPs (some times even local quacks) are consulted. Home-based new born care based on Gadchiroli model and other community based innovations have yet to be made an integral part of the child health strategy.

Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana (RSBY)

Launch of RSBY by Ministry of Labour & Employment in 2007 has been an important step to supplement the efforts being made to provide quality health care to the poor and underprivileged population. It provides cashless health insurance cover up to Rs.30,000 per annum per family. The premium is paid by the Centre and State Governments on a 75:25 sharing basis with the beneficiary paying only a registration fee.

Twenty-five States are in the process of implementing the RSBY and till February 2010, more than 1.25 crore biometric enabled smart cards have been issued for providing health insurance cover to more than 4 crore people, from any empanelled hospital throughout the country. Around 4.5 lakh persons have already availed hospitalisation facility. The scheme is now being gradually extended to the non-BPL category of workers as well. Linkages with RSBY in public sector hospitals need to be strengthened.

National AIDS Control Programme (NACP)

The NACP goal was to halt and reverse the epidemic in India over the five years period of the Eleventh Plan. This was to be done by integrating programmes for prevention, care, support and treatment, as well as addressing the human rights issues specific to people living with HIV/AIDS (PLWHA).. Although the achievement of physical targets under the programme is satisfactory, MoHFW has yet to introduce a HIV/AIDS Bill to protect the rights of children, women and HIV infected persons and avoid discrimination at work place. A National Blood Transfusion Authority is to be established during the remaining period of the Plan. Voluntary blood donation has to be encouraged further to bridge the gap in demand and supply of blood. Expenditure under National AIDS Control Programme including STD control during 2007-08 and 2008-09, has been 112.60 per cent and 91.91 per cent of the approved.

Pradhan Mantri Swasthya Suraksha Yojana (PMSSY)

 The PMSSY envisages substantial expansion of central and state government medical institutions. Phase 1 of PMSSY envisages establishment of six new AIIMS like institutions at Patna (Bihar), Bhopal (Madhya Pradesh), Bhubaneswar (Orissa), Jodhpur (Rajasthan), Raipur (Chhattisgarh) and Rishikesh (Uttarakhand). The original estimate of each institute was Rs. 332 crore and the latest estimate is about Rs. 820 crore. For these new ‘AIIMS like institutions’, construction of medical colleges and hospital complexes and construction of residential complexes have been taken up as separate activities. Construction of housing complex at all six sites has commenced and work for medical colleges and hospital complexes is likely to start in the second quarter of 2010-11.
 The second component of PMSSY Phase 1 includes upgradation of 13 State Government medical college institutions. These are at Government Medical College, Jammu (Jammu & Kashmir); Government Medical College, Srinagar (Jammu & Kashmir); Kolkata Medical College, Kolkata (West Bengal); Sanjay Gandhi Post Graduate Institute of Medical Sciences, Lucknow (Uttar Pradesh); Institute of Medical Sciences, BHU, Varanasi (Uttar Pradesh); Nizam Institute of Medical Sciences, Hyderabad (Andhra Pradesh); Sri Venkateshwara Institute of Medical Sciences, Tirupati (Andhra Pradesh); Government Medical College, Salem (Tamil Nadu); Rajendra Institute of Medical Sciences, Ranchi (Jharkhand); B.J. Medical College, Ahmedabad (Gujarat); Bangalore Medical College, Bangalore (Karnataka); Grants Medical College & Sir J.J. Group of Hospitals, Mumbai, (Maharashtra) and Medical College, Thiruvananthapuram, (Kerala). The outlay provided is Rs.120 crore per institution, of which Rs. 100 crore would be borne by the Central Government (for SVIMS, Tirupati, it is Rs.60 crore) and the remaining amount will be contributed by the respective States. The State Governments will also provide the resources (human resources and recurring expenditure) for running the upgraded facilities. Upgrading of two State Government medical college institutions is over. Another four are expected to be upgraded by July 2010, two by December, 2010 and the remaining in 2011.
 Phase II of PMSSY, approved recently, provides for the establishment of two new AIIMS like institutions in Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal and upgrading of six State Government medical college institutions at Government Medical College, Amritsar (Punjab); Government Medical College, Tanda (Himachal Pradesh); Government Medical College, Nagpur (Maharashtra); Jawaharlal Nehru College of Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh (Uttar Pradesh); Government Medical College, Madurai (Tamil Nadu) and Pandit B.D. Sharma Postgraduate Institute of Medical Sciences, Rohtak (Haryana).
 Overall expenditure under PMSSY had shown improvement in 2008-09 with expenditure of 92.86 per cent as against 58.33 per cent in 2007-08. However, the anticipated expenditure based on RE figures in the current year (2009-10) is only 47.21 per cent of the approved outlay for 2009-10.

AYURVEDA, YOGA AND NATUROPATHY, UNANI, SIDDHA, AND HOMEOPATHY (AYUSH)

 There is a resurgence of interest in holistic systems of health care, especially, in the prevention and management of chronic lifestyle related non-communicable diseases and systemic diseases. To mainstream AYUSH by designing strategic interventions for wider utilization of AYUSH both domestically and globally, the thrust areas in the Eleventh Five YearPlan are: strengthening professional education, strategic research programmes, promotion of best clinical practices, technology upgradation in industry, setting internationally acceptable pharmacopoeial standards, conserving medicinal flora, fauna, metals, and minerals, utilizing human resources of AYUSH in the national health programmes, with the ultimate aim of enhancing the outreach of AYUSH health care in an accessible, acceptable, affordable, and qualitative manner.

 During the Tenth Plan, the Department continued to lay emphasis on upgradation of AYUSH educational standards, quality control, and standardization of drugs, improving the availability of medicinal plant material, R&D, and awareness generation about the efficacy of the systems domestically and internationally. Steps were taken in 2006–07 for mainstreaming AYUSH under NRHM with the objective of optimum utilization of AYUSH for meeting the unmet needs of the population.

Health Care Services under AYUSH
 The AYUSH sector across the country supported a network of 3203 hospitals and 21351 dispensaries. The health services provided by this network largely focused on primary health care. The sector has a marginal presence in secondary and tertiary health care. In the private and not-for-profit sector, there are several thousand AYUSH clinics and around 250 hospitals and nursing homes for in patient care and specialized therapies like Panchkarma.

 In clinics and nursing homes there are anecdotal reports of the role of AYUSH in the successful management of several communicable and noncommunicable diseases. However, there is no macrodata available about the contribution of AYUSH to major national programmes for the management of communicable and NCDs. A major challenge in Eleventh Five Year Plan is to identify reputed clinical centres and support upgradation of their facilities via PPP schemes so that the country can boast of a national network of high-quality clinical facilities developed for rendering specialized health care in strength areas of AYUSH.

AYUSH under NRHM
 Despite having a different scheme of diagnosis, drug requirements, and treatments as compared to the mainstream health care system, preliminary efforts to integrate AYUSH in NRHM were initiated during the Tenth Plan. It is too early to assess if the AYUSH interventions in NRHM have had significant health impact by way of complementing the conventional national health programmes. Integrating AYUSH into NRHM has the potential of enhancing both the quality and outreach of NRHM, especially with the availability of a large number of practitioners in this field. Supporting strategic pilot action research projects in the Eleventh Five Year Plan to evolve viable models of integration seems necessary.

Mainstreaming AYUSH

• NRHM has mainstreamed AYUSH into the rural health services by co-locating AYUSH personnel in primary health care facilities resulting in increase in utilization of AYUSH treatment. AYUSH practitioners are also used to fill in the position of Allopaths in Primary Health Centres particularly in States that have a substantial shortage of MBBS doctors. While this is a positive development, efforts have to be made for training AYUSH practitioners in public health.

Chilling consequences: The economic impact of bouts of severe weather is easily exaggerated

From The Economist, Feb 10, 2011

MUCH of the northern hemisphere has had a miserable winter. Snowstorms shut down many cities and airports across America’s east coast this month and last. In Britain and much of continental Europe, the worst of the weather occurred in the week before Christmas. Life there has long since returned to normal: the forecourts of terminals at Heathrow airport no longer resemble tent cities. But the economic effects of the big freeze are still becoming visible in official data.

Germany’s statistical office announced on February 8th that in December the country’s industrial production shrank by 1.5%, while construction output declined by 24%. It blamed the snow for the slump in construction. January’s bad weather was blamed by many analysts for the weak jobs growth reported in the latest non-farm payrolls numbers in America. Britain’s statistical agency attributed more or less all of the 0.5% fall in GDP in the last quarter of 2010 to the bad weather in December. Some argue that the consequences of bouts of bad weather are more significant still. The Federation of Small Businesses (FSB), a British trade group, estimated that the economy lost £1.2 billion ($1.9 billion) for each day of the December freeze. Five severe “snow days”, say, would therefore have cost Britain around £6 billion. That is a substantial sum for an economy whose quarterly output is worth approximately £330 billion.

It is true that businesses are hurt when they are forced to remain closed and people cannot get into work. Some revenue, like the money spent on coffee by commuters on their way in to work, is simply forgone. After all, people do not buy extra cups when they do eventually return to their offices. And certain industries, such as construction and transportation, are particularly vulnerable to bursts of bad weather. But numbers like those from the FSB almost certainly overestimate the true economic effect of a day of enforced winter holiday.

The group based its figure on the one-fifth or so of Britain’s workers who it reckons did not make it to the office, the factory or the building site during those snowy days in late December. That may be an accurate estimate of snow-induced absenteeism, but it does not mean that a fifth of the £4.5 billion-5 billion of goods and services that the British economy produces on a typical working day was simply lost. Some people work from home when they cannot get into the office; others make up for lost time when they return. A few days of no production at factories might mean a bout of overtime when things return to normal: German construction output may turn out to have boomed in January because people raced to finish projects delayed by snow. Many purchases are likely to have been postponed rather than abandoned altogether. And if people expect bad weather, they may stock up on essentials in anticipation of shops being closed for a day or two, much as they might before a holiday. In America tempers are guaranteed to fray on the day before a snowstorm is expected, as supermarkets run out of supplies. So it seems reasonable to assume that a good deal of economic activity is displaced, rather than destroyed, by bad weather.

Certain industries see demand for their products go up when severe weather hits. People stuck at home may consume more lighting and heating than if they had headed to work. In Britain, for example, the output of utilities grew by 1.2% in the fourth quarter, as it had done in the first three months of 2010 when the country had its last big encounter with snow. In contrast, the milder final quarter of 2009 saw utilities’ output shrink by 2.2%. SnowSports Industries America, a trade group, says that sales of equipment and accessories set a new record in December.

If the net effect on economic activity is unlikely to be as large as bodies like the FSB estimate, are official calculations any closer to the truth? Britain’s official estimate of lost fourth-quarter output—half of 1% of quarterly GDP—is roughly half a day’s worth of production. Without the December snow, reckon the statisticians, output would have been “flattish”. That number is still uncertain but has a firmer basis in fact.

Statistical agencies typically have very little actual data for the last month of the quarter at the time they release their first estimates of quarterly GDP. So in the case of fourth-quarter releases, they usually estimate December’s numbers using the data for October and November, making what they hope are appropriate seasonal adjustments. This time Britain’s number-crunchers were concerned that their normal methods might lead them astray, since the unusually bad weather was concentrated in the month for which they would normally have little data. So they made a big effort to collect data sooner, to have a clearer idea than usual of what was going on in December. They found that their normal estimation methods—which can be thought of as measuring what would have happened in typical December weather—would have led to a figure 0.5% higher than the eventual, published number. This difference was their rough estimate of the impact of the effect of bad weather.

Snow lasting effect

Even the statistical office’s estimate may overstate the eventual cost. Britain’s bout of bad weather came at the end of the quarter, so some activity may just have been displaced into the first three months of 2011. In 2010 Britain suffered a freeze in the first quarter, when GDP grew by 0.3%; in the second quarter, GDP bounced by 1.1%. The statistical office did not formally try to calculate the effects of that bout of bad weather. But it reckons that if the severe weather had not occurred the economy would have grown by the same amount over the whole of the first half of 2010, but spread evenly over the two quarters. If this is right, rich-world economies may enjoy a boost after the end of the winter freeze. Think of the “lost” output as a Christmas present that has been delayed—but eventually turns up.

Food Crisis:What the World Bank Is Doing

1.1 billion people were living on less than $1 a day and 923 million were undernourished, even before the food, fuel and financial crises.

Food prices remain volatile. Local food prices in many countries haven’t come down, although international food prices have fallen.



In response to the severity of the food crisis and the need for prompt action, the World Bank Group set up the Global Food Crisis Response Program (GFRP) in May 2008 to provide immediate relief to countries hard hit by food high prices. The Bank response has been articulated in coordination with the United Nations’ High-Level Task Force on food security.

* The World Bank Group increased the GFRP to $2 billion in April 2009 to provide immediate relief to countries hard hit by food high prices. GFRP was created in May 2008 to reduce the threat high food prices and rising agricultural production and marketing costs pose to the livelihoods of the world’s poor. The expedited processing of GFRP projects, up to an initial ceiling of $1.2 billion, helped speed response.

On April 16, 2009, the Board endorsed a rise in the ceiling from $1.2 billion to $2 billion, but shortened the use of expedited processing by one year to June 30, 2010. In light of the recent rise in food prices again from June 2010, the Board reinstated the initial time period for the use of expedited processing to June 2011. The money is used to feed poor children and other vulnerable groups, provide for nutritional supplements to pregnant women, lactating mothers, infants and small children, to meet additional expenses of food imports or to buy seeds for the new season.

* Grant funding has also been made available through several external-funded trust funds in support of the full range of interventions available under the GFRP. A Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) has received contributions of AUD 50 million from the Australian government, €80 million from the government of Spain, 3 billion Korean Won from the Republic of Korea, CAD 30 million from the government of Canada, and $0.15 million from International Finance Corporation (IFC).

The Russian Federation has also allocated $15 million for the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan, through the Russia Food Price Crisis Rapid Response Trust Fund, which became operational in April 2009. The European Commission has allocated has allocated €111.8 million to support operations in 10 countries. Together the three Trust Funds amount to about $352 million equivalent.

As of January 2011, GFRP has approved $1,443.6 million. To date, $1,077.8 million out of the $1,443.6 million in total approved funding has been disbursed (75% of approved funds).

Total Bank-funded, Board-approved GFRP projects amount to $1,238.2 million, of which $202.4 million is from the Food Price Crisis Response (FPCR) Trust Fund for 27 countries, 17 of which are in Africa; $835.8 million is from IDA for 13 countries; and $200 million is from IBRD for a project in the Philippines. 80 percent of Bank-sourced Board-approved funds have been disbursed).

Under the externally-funded GFRP trust funds, we have approved operations totaling $205.4 million — 10 MDTF-funded projects, two Russia FPCR Trust Fund-funded operations, and 11 European Union (EU) Food Crisis Rapid Response Facility-financed operations.

* The quality of results from World Bank investment in agriculture and rural development through the regular programs remains among the highest priorities. In FY10, IBRD/IDA assistance to agriculture and related rural development, as described in Implementing Agriculture for Development: World Bank Group Agriculture Action Plan, FY10-12, was $4.1 billion (7% of total IBRD/IDA). This is a decrease from the $5.3 billion in FY09, but is higher than the average of $3 billion per year over FY06-08. One reason for the drop in assistance was the food crisis response that induced “front-loading” of projects into FY09 originally scheduled for FY10. The rapidly emerging financial crisis, which led to strong competing demand for large financial transfers vis-a-vis investment projects, also contributed to the drop in FY10 agricultural lending.
* In addition to the IBRD/IDA investments of $4.1 billion, IFC invested $2 billion in agribusiness and related sectors, resulting in total World Bank Group assistance of $6.1 billion to agriculture and related rural development lending.
* The Bank tripled investments in safety nets and other social protection programs in health and education to $12 billion over next two years, as announced in April 2009.

* The Bank established an Agriculture Finance Support Facility to expand rural finance through a $20 million Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation contribution, as announced in June 2009. The Facility will increase access to financial services, such as savings, credit, payments and insurance.

* The Bank helps countries develop financial market insurance products and risk management strategies to ensure increased capacity to respond to future prices increases, such as weather derivatives and crop insurance.

* Through the HLTF Secretariat, the Bank works through existing country-level coordination mechanisms and regional initiatives such as the Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Program (CAADP) to identify opportunities and constraints in CFA implementation on the ground. The Bank actively participated in the updating of the U.N.’s Comprehensive Framework for Action (CFA). (Source: World Bank, January, 2011)

Food Price Hike Drives 44 Million People into Poverty--World Bank

(Transcript of opening remarks by World Bank Group President Robert B. Zoellick media teleconference)

WASHINGTON, February 15, 2011 – Rising food prices have driven an estimated 44 million people into poverty in developing countries since last June as food costs continue to rise to near 2008 levels, according to new World Bank Group numbers released ahead of the G20 Meeting of Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors in Paris.

“Global food prices are rising to dangerous levels and threaten tens of millions of poor people around the world,” said World Bank Group President Robert B. Zoellick. “The price hike is already pushing millions of people into poverty, and putting stress on the most vulnerable, who spend more than half of their income on food.”

According to the latest edition of Food Price Watch, the World Bank’s food price index rose by 15 percent between October 2010 and January 2011, is 29 percent above its level a year earlier, and is only 3 percent below its 2008 peak.

Among grains, global wheat prices have risen the most, doubling between June 2010 and January 2011. Maize prices are about 73 percent higher, but crucially for many of the world’s poor, rice prices have increased at a slower rate than other grains. Sugar and edible oils have also gone up sharply. Other food items essential for dietary diversity in many countries have increased, such as vegetables in India and China, and beans in some African countries.

According to Food Price Watch, the increase in extreme poverty (under US$1.25 a day) due to the price hike is associated with higher malnutrition, as poorer people eat less and are forced to buy food that is both less expensive and less nutritious.

In contrast to the 2008 food price spike, two factors have prevented even more people falling into poverty this time. One is that good harvests in many African countries have kept prices stable, especially for maize, a key staple. Another is the fact that the increases in global rice prices have been moderate and the outlook for the rice market appears stable.

Measures to address the recent round of food price spikes include expanding nutritional and safety net programs in countries where food prices are rising fastest, avoiding food export restrictions, and finding better information on food stocks. More investments in agriculture, the development of less food-intensive biofuels, and climate change adaptation, are also needed.

How the World Bank is helping:

The World Bank’s Global Food Crisis Response Program (GFRP) is helping some 40 million people in need through $1.5 billion in support. To date, over 40 low income countries are receiving or will receive assistance through new and improved seeds, irrigation, and other farm support and food assistance for the most vulnerable people. For example, in Benin, fertilizer provided through these resources led to the production of an extra 100,000 tons of cereal.

For the longer-term, the World Bank Group is boosting its spending on agriculture to some $6-8 billion a year from $4.1 billion in 2008.

In addition, we are supporting:

· The new Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (GAFSP), set up by the World Bank in April 2010 at the request of the G20 to support country-led agriculture and food security plans and help promote investments in smallholder farmers. To date, six countries and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation have pledged about US$925 million to the program over the next three years, with $350 million received so far. Since its launch, GAFSP has approved and started disbursing grants worth $321 million to 8 countries - Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Haiti, Mongolia, Niger, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Togo.

· Advocacy for more investment in agricultural research, and for its improved effectiveness - including through the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research.

· Monitoring agricultural trade to identify potential food shortages.

· Coordinating with UN agencies through the High-Level Task Force on the Global Food Security Crisis and with Non-Governmental Organizations.

· IFC has significantly scaled up its investments in the sector, providing nearly $2 billion in fiscal 2010 along the agribusiness supply chain to boost agricultural production, increase liquidity in supply chains, improve logistics and distribution, and increase access to credit for small farmers.

The World Bank Group also supports wider measures to improve nutrition among vulnerable groups. Through Bank safety net programs such as conditional cash transfers, some 2.3 million school meals are provided every day to children in low income countries. The World Bank is also working with the World Food Programme to help feed 22 million children in 70 countries. Over the past decade, the World Bank has provided 98 million children with Vitamin A doses, information on improved child feeding practices, and de-worming.

Food crisis: Warning of a warming world By Paul Krugman

(Published in: The Deccan Chronicle, February 8th, 2011)

We’re in the midst of a global food crisis — the second in three years. World food prices hit a record in January, driven by huge increases in the prices of wheat, corn, sugar and oils. These soaring prices have had only a modest effect on US inflation, which is still low by historical standards, but they’re having a brutal impact on the world’s poor, who spend much if not most of their income on basic foodstuffs.

The consequences of this food crisis go far beyond economics. After all, the big question about uprisings against corrupt and oppressive regimes in West Asia isn’t so much why they’re happening as why they’re happening now. And there’s little question that sky-high food prices have been an important trigger for popular rage.

So what’s behind the price spike? American Right-wingers (and the Chinese) blame easy-money policies at the Federal Reserve, with at least one commentator declaring that there is “blood on Bernanke’s hands”. Meanwhile, President Nicolas Sarkozy of France blames speculators, accusing them of “extortion and pillaging”.

But the evidence tells a different, much more ominous story. While several factors have contributed to soaring food prices, what really stands out is the extent to which severe weather events have disrupted agricultural production. And these severe weather events are exactly the kind of thing we’d expect to see as rising concentrations of greenhouse gases change our climate — which means that the current food price surge may be just the beginning.

Now, to some extent soaring food prices are part of a general commodity boom: the prices of many raw materials, running the gamut from aluminum to zinc, have been rising rapidly since early 2009, mainly thanks to rapid industrial growth in emerging markets.

But the link between industrial growth and demand is a lot clearer for, say, copper than it is for food. Except in very poor countries, rising incomes don’t have much effect on how much people eat.

It’s true that growth in emerging nations like China leads to rising meat consumption, and hence rising demand for animal feed. It’s also true that agricultural raw materials, especially cotton, compete for land and other resources with food crops — as does the subsidised production of ethanol, which consumes a lot of corn. So both economic growth and bad energy policy have played some role in the food price surge.

Still, food prices lagged behind the prices of other commodities until last summer. Then the weather struck.

Consider the case of wheat, whose price has almost doubled since the summer. The immediate cause of the wheat price spike is obvious: world production is down sharply. The bulk of that production decline, according to US department of agriculture data, reflects a sharp plunge in the former Soviet Union. And we know what that’s about: a record heat wave and drought, which pushed Moscow temperatures above 100 degrees for the first time ever.

The Russian heat wave was only one of many recent extreme weather events, from dry weather in Brazil to biblical-proportion flooding in Australia, that have damaged world food production.

The question then becomes, what’s behind all this extreme weather?

To some extent we’re seeing the results of a natural phenomenon, La Niña — a periodic event in which water in the equatorial Pacific becomes cooler than normal. And La Niña events have historically been associated with global food crises, including the crisis of 2007-2008.

But that’s not the whole story. Don’t let the snow fool you: globally, 2010 was tied with 2005 for warmest year on record, even though we were at a solar minimum and La Niña was a cooling factor in the second half of the year. Temperature records were set not just in Russia but in no fewer than 19 countries, covering a fifth of the world’s land area. And both droughts and floods are natural consequences of a warming world: droughts because it’s hotter, floods because warm oceans release more water vapour.

As always, you can’t attribute any one weather event to greenhouse gases. But the pattern we’re seeing, with extreme highs and extreme weather in general becoming much more common, is just what you’d expect from climate change.

The usual suspects will, of course, go wild over suggestions that global warming has something to do with the food crisis; those who insist that Ben Bernanke has blood on his hands tend to be more or less the same people who insist that the scientific consensus on climate reflects a vast leftist conspiracy.

But the evidence does, in fact, suggest that what we’re getting now is a first taste of the disruption, economic and political, that we’ll face in a warming world. And given our failure to act on greenhouse gases, there will be much more, and much worse, to come.

Tuesday, February 15, 2011

India, By Its People by Nandan Nilekani

Our huge population is not an economic albatross. Today, India's growth story is increasingly the story of its young population.
Nandan Nilekani


In Delhi this Monday morning, it is chaos. Despite its pristine new metro and expanding highways, the city can barely contain the morning hubbub, the swarm of people all trying to get somewhere. By the time I reach Kaushiak Basu's home—set a little apart from the highway, on a quiet street that is empty except for a single, lazy cow who stops in front of the car, in no hurry to move—I am very late, a little grimy, but exhilarated.

Kaushik and I chat about how the crowds in the city look completely different compared to, say, two decades ago. Then, you would see people lounging near tea-shops, reading the morning paper late into the afternoon, puffing languorously at their beedis and generally shooting the breeze. But as India has changed—bursting forth as one of the world's fastest-growing countries—so has the scene on the street. And as Kaushik points out, it is this new restlessness, the hum and thrum of its people, that is the sound of India's economic engine today.

Kaushik is the author of a number of books on India and teaches economics at Cornell, and his take on India's growth—of a country driven by human capital—is now well-accepted. India's position as the world's go-to destination for talent is hardly surprising; we may have been short on various things at various times, but we have always had plenty of people. The crowded tumult of our cities is something I experience every day as I navigate my way to our Bangalore office through a dense crowd that overflows from the footpaths and on to the road—of software engineers waiting at bus stops, groups of women in colourful saris, on their way to their jobs at the garment factories that line the road, men in construction hats heading towards the semi-completed highway. And then there are the people milling around the cars, hawking magazines and pirated versions of the latest best-sellers. Looking around, I think that if people are the engine of India's growth, our economy has only just begun to rev up.

But to the demographic experts of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, India's population made the country quite simply a disaster of epic proportions. Paul Ehlrich's visit to Delhi in 1966 forms the opening of his book The Population Bomb, and his shock as he describes India's crowds is palpable: "People eating, people washing, people sleeping... people visiting, arguing and screaming... people clinging to buses... people, people, people."

But in the last two decades, this depressing vision of India's population as an 'overwhelming burden' has been turned on its head. With growth, our human capital has emerged as a vibrant source of workers and consumers not just for India, but also for the global economy. But this change in our attitudes has not come easily. Since Independence, India struggled for decades with policies that tried to put the lid on its surging population. It is only recently that the country has been able to look its billion in the eye and consider its advantages.

Different demographic destinies
A common grouse we have in India is how slow we are—to reform, adapt and change, especially compared to our neighbour China. But my belief is that while democracies may be slow, they are also more cautious than autocracies, and this makes them less prone to committing truly egregious errors. Standing and ruminating over voter considerations after all is much more preferable to dashing straight into a gorge.

For instance, during the Malthusian hysteria of the 1960s, both India and China were pushed—at times shoved—by international organisations to control their population growth. What stood in its way were India's voters: they did not like the idea of family planning and no amount of pretty slogans were going to make them change their minds. After the government that had brought in the cutting implements for nasbandi got tossed out of power, no Indian government would touch forcible family planning with a beanpole.

By the end of the 1970s, the Chinese government was also bitten by the population panic bug and began to emphasise population control to promote 'social harmony' and optimum growth. The government first launched the 'Later, Longer, Fewer' campaign, and then the one-child policy, which Deng Xiaoping implemented in 1981.

Under the wisdom of the 1970s and 1980s, the family planning programme in China was an enormous success. The argument in their defence is familiar dictator PR-speak—that it was 'coercion for a good cause'. [1] In 1983 Indira Gandhi and China's family planning minister, Qian Xinzhong, were jointly given the United Nations award for "the most outstanding contribution to the awareness of population questions". [2] However, even as these awards were being handed out, the view of population as a pestilence was beginning to shift.

From albatross to advantage
By the late 1970s, the Malthusian scientists had egg on their faces. They had predicted massive population-led catastrophes in India and China by the end of the 1970s. But the years passed, and the moment of mass death failed to arrive. By the 1980s academics had begun to harrumph and shake their heads at the downer theorists and re-examine populations in terms of their impact on economic growth. The Indian economist (and later Nobel laureate) Amartya Sen pointed out that India had not seen a famine since it had become a democracy, even while its population had continued to grow. The economist Julian Simon argued that as population increased, so did the stock of creativity and innovation: "The ultimate resource is human imagination." [3] This idea of population as an asset rather than a burden has especially gained currency with the rise of knowledge-based industries such as IT, telecommunications and biotechnology in the 1970s. In fact the information economy is the culmination of what the Industrial Revolution started—it has placed human capital front and centre as the main driver of productivity and growth.

I do shy away, however, from unbridled optimism—that would be almost as bad as the previous mood of relentless pessimism on population growth. The pressures of India's vast population are indeed humungous—our natural resources are no bottomless pool. A billion people may offer us a deep base of human capital, but it also signals a potentially massive, detrimental burden on our environment, food production and resources, as millions of people join the middle class, ramp up their consumption, and per capita energy intake grows. We will have to find solutions for these concerns.

Nevertheless, the impact of human capital in India has so far had large payoffs for the economy, especially since the 1991 reforms. Our skilled workers have been the nerve stem of the IT, biotechnology, pharmaceuticals and telecommunications industries in India. Globally as well, human creativity and economic competitiveness are now closely linked, and competition among countries is competition between their human capital. As Tom Friedman notes, these days rather than tell his children to finish their dinner because people are going hungry, "I tell my daughters to finish their homework because people in China and India are starving for their jobs."

For a better idea of what has happened to our attitudes towards population, I spoke to the Harvard demographer David Bloom. I met David for the first time at Davos in 2006, a decade after his paper titled 'Demographic Transitions and Economic Miracles in Emerging Asia' made him famous much beyond academic circles—he is now one of those enviable scientists who can have a cocktail party audience hang on to his every word.

David tells me that the key problem with early population theories was that "they were obsessed with overall population growth as an indicator, while ignoring the trends that lurked inside those figures". These trends, David notes, were uncovered when he and fellow demographer Jeffrey Williamson were puzzling over the growth in one particular region—East Asia.

When David and Jeffrey looked inside East Asia's magic hat, they discovered a remarkable population trend that happened to coincide with its rapid growth. Between 1950 and 2000, the chances that an infant would die in East Asia fell sharply from 181 per 1,000 births to just 34, and this caused fertility to fall from six children to two per woman. "And the children who had unexpectedly survived formed a 'boom generation'."

This generation created a large number of young, enterprising workers, who themselves had fewer children and therefore few dependents—in fact East Asia's working-age population at this time grew nearly four times faster than its dependent population. As a result the economies in the region had to spend a lower percentage of their incomes on the social costs of a dependent population. Lower costs meant that this generation could save more—we have seen this in India, where a larger working population has helped push the country's savings rate as a proportion of GDP to 34 per cent in 2008, and it is set to rise even higher to 40 per cent by 2015. Such savings create additional capital for investment across the economy.

This extra money is especially valuable during boom generations, when the cumulative energy and creativity of a young, unencumbered population frees people not just to spend and save, but also to invent and innovate. Additionally, as the number of children per woman in East Asia fell from six to two, women were able to join the workforce and contribute to GDP growth. This demographically rich generation drove East Asia's rise as a manufacturing and technology power—including the growth of Singapore in manufacturing and retail, of Hong Kong in finance and of Taiwan in electronics.

In all, Bloom and Williamson discovered, this wave of young workers contributed to as much as one-third of East Asia's economic rise between 1965 and 1990. "We showed," David tells me, "that particular kinds of population growth could dramatically drive the country's growth, not impede it as economists used to believe."

David called this effect the 'demographic dividend', a phrase that has quickly caught on. And with good reason. When demographers went back and looked at previous periods of sustained economic growth from Europe to the United States to Asia, they found that they coincided time and again with similar patterns of large numbers of young people, and fewer dependents.

The dividends of an autocracy, versus a democracy
Population scientists are universally fond of noting that 'demographics is destiny', but in India's case, it is both demographics and democracy. Today, India's growth story is increasingly the story of its young population. Our economy is the most dynamic in terms of its human capital—India has one of the youngest populations in the world, with a median age of 23, at a time when the rest of the globe is going grey.

China's young and unencumbered generation had come three decades earlier than India's, in the 1970s. It was the generation of the Great Leap, during which China shifted towards capitalism and rapid growth, and experienced massive social upheaval. China's one-child families also meant more focused investments in children, and this generation saw literacy and college completion rates explode. The one-child policy, however, has created the '4, 2, 1' population structure in China—four grandparents, two parents and one child, resulting in fewer young workers and below-replacement level birth rates since the early 1990s.

These family structures in China have been far more disruptive than we immediately realise. The sociologist Dr Andre Beteille makes an especially astute observation. "Almost none of the Chinese have siblings," he points out, "which means no aunts, uncles or cousins. An incredibly alien notion for the rest of the world is the Chinese reality." The single-child family has also created the uniquely Chinese 'little emperor' syndrome—an only child has the undivided attention of the adults in his or her family, which is creating a 'me generation' of highly individualistic young.

Family planning has also intensified certain social challenges. Both China and India have a worrying but popular preference for sons—it is a feudal carryover, the consequence of a persistent, patriarchal mindset. A recent court case in India for a missing girl underlined the worst of this attitude. The presiding judge in the case, astonished on hearing the name of the girl, turned to the parents and asked them, "Why did you name your daughter Nirasha (disappointment)?" Their lawyer responded, "Milord, it was their fifth daughter."

Prosperity has not changed this preference completely—even as the status of women has improved and a rising emphasis on old-age security based on financial investments has dimmed the charms of the male child, factors such as ultrasound technology have made sex-selective births easier. Sex-selective abortions have dragged the sex ratio down to 925 girls for every 1,000 boys, and this has fallen below 750 in some north Indian districts. In China the one-child policy has intensified the girl deficit even more—nationally it stands at 855 girls for every 1,000 boys. This alarming 'disappearance' of women will lead to an estimated forty million Chinese men aged between 15 and 39 by 2026 who will be 'bare branches' [4], unlikely to have families or children of their own. In retrospect, India may have gained some economic and social advantages simply due to its reluctance, or perhaps inability, to fiddle with its demographic curve. This also means that our dividend is now right before us, both as a potential and as an enormous challenge.

Demographics and democracy: India's destiny
India is coming into its dividend as an unusually young country in an unusually ageing market—a young, fresh-faced nation in a greying world. Globally, more people than ever before are entering retirement. In fact, even by the 1980s, the heads of European countries had begun to worry out loud about Europe's falling population. "Europe is vanishing... our countries will be empty ," [5] the French president Jacques Chirac had said—the continent was becoming a place of "old people, living in old houses, ruminating about old ideas." [6]

This trend of an ageing, shrinking population now visible across much of the developed world, is coinciding with India's experience of a demographic dividend that will last until 2050. This opens up interesting new opportunities for the country, as the challenge of maintaining wealth in ageing societies means that developed markets will have to increasingly outsource their labour requirements. In 2020 India is projected to have an additional 47 million workers, almost equal to the total world shortfall. The average Indian will be only 29 years old, compared with the average age of 37 in China and the United States, 45 in Western Europe and 48 in Japan.

An early sign of the immense potential of our human capital has been the growth of India's IT/BPO sector and the rise of 'transformational outsourcing' by multinational firms across industries. The country has seen its global profile rise rapidly on the strength of its human capital—its entrepreneurs, scientists, engineers and management graduates.

India already has the second largest reservoir of skilled labour in the world. It produces two million English-speaking graduates, 15,000 law graduates and about 9,000 PhDs every year. And the existing pool of 2.1 million engineering graduates increases by nearly 3,00,000 every year.

A talented pool of workers, along with abundant capital and investment, presents us with immense opportunities for creativity and innovation, which can in turn lead to rapid gains in productivity, growth and GDP. This had once enabled Europe to emerge as a centre for manufacturing innovation in the nineteenth century; similarly, at the peak of its dividend between 1970 and 1990, the United States saw the birth of new technology-based industries that determined the direction of the global economy over the past few decades. Such an opportunity—to emerge as the new creative power and a centre for new knowledge and innovation—now lies with India.

India is also emerging as a rapidly growing consumer market for the world economy, with a middle class that is already larger than the population of the United States and two-thirds the size of the European Union. Our demographic dividend is set to trigger a further explosion in middle-class consumers as the boom generation comes of age, and over the next two decades India's middle class will swell to over 580 million people. At the same time, the lack of dependents will enable a new phase of guilt-free consumption. It is these multiple forces that are expected to drive a growth rate of five per cent for India until 2050 [7]—a trend that, if it happens, will be unique and unprecedented in economic history.

India's double-hump: The camel in our demographics
Demographers such as Tim Dyson and P.N. Mari Bhat have shown that if we peel India's demographics like an onion, we end up with two very distinct areas within the country—a north that, thanks to its recent high fertility, stays remarkably young over the next two decades, and a south which faces rapid ageing. [8] By 2025 north India's population will still be very young, with a median age of just 26. But the median age in the south would be about 34—similar to Europe's in the late 1980s. [9]

This means that India's demographic dividend is actually a double hump, one of which is already nearly exhausted. The first hump of the dividend came from the south and has been 'expensed' in the economic growth that the south and the west of India experienced as early as the 1970s, when their infant mortality began to fall. In the northern states, however, infant mortality has only just started to trend down. [10]
As a result it is the second, larger hump in India's dividend which is yet to peak, and which will come from the northern states—and primarily from the bimaru regions. The demographer Ashish has estimated that the share of BIMARU states alone in our population growth between 2001 and 2026 will be around 50 per cent, while the share of the south will be only 12.6 per cent. As a result, over the next decade, the north should begin to ride the crest of its dividend, towards higher growth.
We have to make sure, however, that this dividend does not turn out to be fool's gold.

Before sunset
The strength of a large pool of young workers can quickly turn into a weakness if India fails to implement effective policies in education and health, and create sufficient opportunities for work and income. Today, however, just 13 per cent of our young population enroll for higher education. As a result India is already experiencing constraints in its access to skilled labour. India's challenges in creating enough jobs have also already begun—a large percentage of our labour force is now in the tenuous unorganised market, with its attendant frailties of seasonal employment and lack of social security. As more people join the workforce, the challenges of providing long-term employment will only grow. Our failure to create these opportunities can turn the dividend into a crisis. We have already experienced these problems through the 1970s and 1980s, when unemployment and the lack of income mobility for working-age Indians fed into criminality and extremist movements across India—such as the extreme-left Naxalite and extreme-right Bajrang Dal movements—as well as the rise of the underworld in major cities. Key players in Bombay's underworld, for instance, were people belonging to discriminated groups and the impoverished underclass—Chhota Rajan was the son of a Dalit sweeper, Abu Salem's mother rolled beedis for a living, Chhota Shakeel grew up in a Bombay slum and Arun Gawli's father was a textile worker laid off during the mill strikes of the 1970s. While these circumstances do not exonerate their actions in the least, these are signs of how economic bitterness can create high social costs.

India will also need policies that address the balance of power for women in the workforce. The economist Abhijit Banerjee, who works at the Poverty Action Lab at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, has emphasised that educating women is a very effective means of improving our social indicators, particularly those related to fertility and health. An educated woman, for instance, insists on educating her children, which is why, as Abhijit notes, "when you educate a woman, you typically educate a family." He points out how education would greatly empower women in participating in the workforce, boosting a group that has long been under-represented in the Indian economy. Participation among women right now still stands at a low 31 per cent, and their education would "enable us to tap into our pool of workers much more effectively."

Once India's 'double-hump dividend' reaches its sunset years, social costs will soar. What we have right now is therefore a critical piggy-bank period for our economy; if we cannot increase incomes, education levels and output per capita for workers during the demographic window, any savings for our future ageing will be low. This is our biggest, but also our last chance.

A young, turbulent people
"The difference between China and India," Dr Beteille says, "is that China can manoeuvre into sharp policy shifts in order to manage its demographics, and quell violence." But India's coming demographic changes are complicated to control, thanks to its democracy. In addition, India has several demographically prominent religious and caste groups, who have been powerful in determining election outcomes. These groups can corner state resources, and often demand policies that give them unique access to markets, in the form of reservations in jobs and colleges.

This makes demographics in India not just one factor in politics, but the central factor. This gives critical importance to India's ability to manage political and cultural tensions, and ensure that this competition for resources between groups does not turn into outright fights, as demographics change across regions, and as people migrate and push outwards into the cities in search of opportunity.

India's tensions around its changing population are already evident in the strongly in-group rhetoric of parties in many Indian states. For instance, K.S. Sudarshan, the chief of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), appeals to Hindu families to "have a dozen sons"—a windfall of infants meant to ensure that Hindus remain dominant in India's demographics and elections. The double hump of India's demographics is also worsening regional rivalries, as labour shortages in the south enable migrants from the north to take advantage of jobs. And as different communities collide while competing for the same jobs and for seats in educational institutions, hostilities have soared—as in Maharashtra in the rhetoric against non-Marathi-speaking Indians, in Delhi in the debate over worker ID cards and in Karnataka in the efforts to make the local tongue, Kannada, the 'sole language'.

Governments can choose to either fan the flames for short-term votes or intelligently address the questions that are rising around hiring practices and admissions in educational institutions across states, the right to use one's language in the public sphere, and cultural identity. Governments here will have to choose between reforms that improve access to jobs and education and short-term, divisive politics. This will be key to determining how much the country will gain from its emerging dividend.

The impact of our changing demographics will be a cycle in either effectiveness or disaster—harnessing it for growth will minimise our divides and dampen the demand for community-based benefits. But if we fail, our demographic curve will become a line to a powder keg.

'People, people, people': Our changing impressions
Looking back, the common man and woman have been bit players in our histories, their role determined by statistics and crowds. It is only recently, particularly since the 1970s, with the rise of labour productivity and the knowledge economy, that the political power of people has been accompanied with greater economic power.

This shift in power has been especially significant in India. For a long time, governments regarded the country's population as its great liability. Vastly poor and illiterate, India's people were 'the great unwashed', a burden not just for the country but also a worry for the rest of the world. Today, however, India's growth is credited to its strength in human capital, and the rise of IT in India, for instance, is seen in terms of 'Indian talent',11 as entrepreneurs and workers overcame the barriers that existed in the 1990s to drive growth.

Our human capital has thus transformed from an albatross into India's most significant advantage. There is a growing realisation within our government that India's most critical reforms will be those that impact the quality of our upcoming demographic dividend—and it is consequently policies in education, health and labour laws that are receiving the closest attention.

We can trace the change in sentiment to the topmost levels of India's governments. Indira Gandhi, referring to the country's crowds, had once said, "We cannot afford to be a flabby nation." But Manmohan Singh says, "It is in India's superb human capital that our advantage lies." The change in this idea of population as a 'burden' to population as an 'asset' is central to what is driving India today.

But the role of people as 'human capital' requires props that are still missing, or only half there. Our vast numbers of people can only participate in our growth story if we provide them 'access'—to the roads that take them to work, to lights that allow them to study at night and the English skills that enable them to tap into the benefits of our growth.

In some ways, the rise of this boom generation is in itself paving the way towards the solutions it needs. The exuberance of this demographic, this pool of restless, ambitious, young workers not hamstrung by tradition and old habit, is a shot in the arm in terms of new ideas and opportunities. And democracy is ensuring that their voices are heard, and the state is beginning to respond.

For instance, the same day that the young Indian cricket captain Mahendra Singh Dhoni led his team of twenty-something players to victory in the Twenty20 ICC World Cup, the Congress party announced Rajiv Gandhi's son, the 38-year-old Rahul, as the general secretary of the party. During the announcement, one party worker alluded to Rahul as Congress's Dhoni. This is not a token move—there has been a simultaneous push to induct other young leaders to senior positions in both the Congress and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).

And at political rallies in even the most rural parts of India, there is a clear change in the tenor of the speeches. At one such rally in the small town of Bettiah in Bihar, held in 2007, the air shimmered with heat and possibility. On a makeshift dais, the chief minister, Nitish Kumar, was promising more jobs and business investment for the state's young citizens. "Our young people leave the state and go for jobs elsewhere....We need to make such opportunities happen here. Only then will the young stay." His words were met with roars of approval. It is a sound that gives me hope. (Source: Outlook Magazine)

Mubarak And India: Hosni wasn’t fond of us, perceived slights the undoing-- Vinod Mehta

To call Hosni Mubarak a despot or tyrant is inaccurate. His dictatorship is more relaxed, more avuncular, and less brutal than, say, a Saddam Hussein or Muammar Gaddafi. For the past 30 years, Mubarak has been haunted by a single fear: assassination. Since he came to power via a spectacular public slaying of his predecessor, Anwar Sadat, Mubarak and his close advisors have ensured he is mostly invisible in his own country, except on television or in parliament.

When I visited Cairo just after Yasser Arafat’s death, the taxi-driver wouldn’t even take me to the heavily barricaded street in which the presidential palace is situated. I later learnt that Mubarak is almost never seen in public, especially after the close shave he had in Ethiopia in 1995. The Islamic Jehad group had taken responsibility for the failed attempt then. You could say he is a stranger in his own country.

Mubarak faced a tricky situation after Arafat’s death. An elaborate funeral march, in which top Arab leaders would take part, with the coffin passing through the main street in Cairo, was scheduled to be led by the Egyptian president. He would have been a sitting target then for his numerous enemies, mostly Islamists. However, given Egypt’s identification with the Palestinian cause, it was unthinkable for the march not to be led by Mubarak. A clever plan was hatched. A curtailed event did take place, but the President, after a brief exposure to the chanting crowds, was whisked away to safety in a helicopter.

Mubarak is not especially fond of India. Two perceived slights rankle with him. In the early ’80s, Indira Gandhi hosted a banquet for non-aligned leaders in New York. Whether by accident or by design, Mubarak was denied a seat at the high table. When the BJP was in power, prime minister Atal Behari Vajpayee, on Brajesh Mishra’s advice, refused to take a telephone call from Mubarak. Apparently, the president wanted to give some advice on Kashmir. Till today, when Indian delegations meet Mubarak in Cairo, he always reminds them of the discourtesy shown to him by the Indian government.

In 1995, India gave Hosni Mubarak the Jawaharlal Nehru Award for promoting international understanding. He accepted the award but refused to come to Delhi personally, as all previous winners had done, to receive it. India dug its heels in: if he didn’t come, he would not get the award. Thirteen years later, in 2008, Mubarak made the trip to India to be honoured by Pratibha Patil.

Besides his antipathy for India, Mubarak’s reluctance to come to the subcontinent has another reason: if he comes to India, he would have no option but to visit Pakistan. If he went there, he was sure he would be shot by jehadists angered by Egypt’s close ties with Israel.

One thing is sure: Mubarak is not likely to visit India again.
(Source : Outlook Magazine)

Third Annual Hiren Mukerjee Lecture by Jagdish Bhagwati

The Unfinished Reform Agenda: 'Politicians should be looking to augment reforms, not reverse them as misguided anti-reform critics urge'
Jagdish Bhagwati

The first Hiren Mukerjee Memorial Annual Parliamentary Lecture was given by Nobel laureate, Amartya Sen as was the second, by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus. The third was given on December 2, 2010 in the Central Hall of Parliament House by a man no less distinguished, someone who's been considered as a certainty for a Nobel for a long time: Jagdish Bhagwati, University Professor, Economics and Law, Columbia University. Edited excerpts

Perhaps the most appropriate tribute to the memory of the illustrious parliamentarian, Professor Hiren Mukerjee, would consist in the celebration of Indian democracy of which the Lok Sabha itself is the chief symbol.

India was for decades unique in her democracy among the post-colonial countries that had gained Independence. Today that uniqueness has thankfully disappeared as several countries around the world have followed in India’s footsteps.

But our embrace of democracy from the outset does set us apart from, and puts us in a higher pecking order relative to China whose egregious denial of democratic and other human rights detracts hugely from admiration for its stellar economic performance.

India has not just the Lok Sabha and elections; it also has all the elements of what we now call a ’liberal democracy’. I must add that our democracy has been a source of immense gratification, not just to elites, but also to the common man.

It is easy to slip into the fallacy that the masses yearn for economic gains, not for political rights. I have long argued that economic betterment, in a country with an immense backlog of poverty, inevitably takes time.

But let me to turn now to the central question that I wish to address today: the question of economic reforms, what they have accomplished, and where we are and should be headed.

On what we have accomplished so far, what I call the ’Reforms Yesterday’, there are two conflicting ’narratives’ that we find currently, one adoringly celebratory and the other hypercritical and condemning.

Perhaps the most dramatic, optimistic view of India has come from the once sceptical magazine, The Economist, which famously wrote nearly twenty years ago that India was a tiger that was crouched for long but unable to leap; the danger was that rigor mortis had set in.

But the magazine wrote a raving cover page story on September 10th, 2010, abandoning its reservations and arguing that India’s steadily accelerating growth rate since the 1991 pro-market, liberal (or ’neoliberal’ if you wish to make them sound sinister) reforms was not a flash in the pan.

Apparently throwing caution to the wind, it speculated that India’s growth rate ’could overtake China’s by 2013, if not before’.

But then, the naysayers, among them the socialists in the currently ruling Congress Party, have rejected the ’miracle’ produced by the reforms by asserting darkly that the growth ’lacks a human face’, that it is not ’inclusive’, that the gains have accrued to the rich while the poor have been immiserized, that inequality has increased, and that India stands condemned before the world.

Perhaps the most articulate critics are the ’progressive’ novelists of India, chief among them Pankaj Mishra whom the op-ed page editors of The New York Times regularly and almost exclusively invite to write about the Indian economy, a privilege they do not seem to extend symmetrically to American novelists to give us their profound thoughts on the US economy!

Mishra’s latest Times op-ed on October 2, 2010, writes of the ’alarmingly deep and growing inequalities of income and resources in India’, ’the waves of suicides of tens of thousands of overburdened farmers over the last two decades’, ’a full-blown insurgency . . . in central India’ to defend tribals against depredations by multinationals, ’the pitiless exploitations of the new business-minded India’, and much else that is allegedly wrong with India!

While economic analysis can often produce a yawning indifference, and Mishra’s narrative is by contrast eloquent and captivating, the latter is really fiction masquerading as non-fiction.

The fact is that several analyses show that the enhanced growth rate has been good for reducing poverty while it has not increased inequality measured meaningfully, and that large majorities of virtually all underprivileged groups polled say that their financial situation has not worsened and significant numbers say that it has improved.

The enhanced, and increasing, growth rate since the reforms follow a period of abysmal growth rates in the range of 3.5 to 4.00 per cent annually for over a quarter of a century, starting in the 1960s. The cause had to do, not with our efforts at raising our investment rate, but with the fact that we got very little out of the investment we undertook.

The reason was that we had a counterproductive policy framework whose principal elements were:

1. Knee-jerk intervention by the government through a maze of Kafkaesque licensing and regulations concerning investment, production and imports, prompting the witticism that Adam Smith’s Invisible Hand was nowhere to be seen;

2. Massive expansion of the public sector into many areas other than utilities , with occasional monopoly granted to public enterprises by excluding entry by the private sector, with predictable inefficiencies that multiplied through the economy; and

3. Autarky in trade and inflow of equity investment which was so extreme that the Indian share of trade to GNP had fallen while it had increased in most countries whereas the inward flow of equity investment had been reduced to minuscule levels.

This policy framework had been questioned, and its total overhaul advocated, by me and Padma Desai in writings through the late 1960s which culminated in our book, India: Planning for Industrialization (Oxford University Press: 1970) with a huge blowback at the time from virtually all the other leading economists and policymakers who were unable to think outside the box.

In the end, our views prevailed and the changes which would transform the economy began, after an external payments crisis in 1991, under the forceful leadership of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh who was the finance minister at the time.

It is often suggested that the Indian policy changes were imposed from outside, reflecting what has come to be known by ill-informed observers as the Washington Consensus in favour of liberal reforms at the Bretton Woods institutions.

But that is no more true than to argue that the Soviet perestroika under President Gorbachev and the Chinese economic reforms starting in the late 1970s were imposed by Washington.

In all three cases, the driving force was endogenous, a realization by the leadership that the old, counterproductive policy model had run their economies into the ground and that a change of course had to be undertaken.

The early reforms were primarily focused on dismantling the licensing regime (known popularly as the ’permit Raj’) which freed up the animal spirits of the private sector.

The economy was also steadily opened up: the average import tariff on manufactures, at virtually 113 per cent in 1990-91, was reduced steadily, avoiding the folly of ’shock therapy’, and now stands at 12 per cent.

While privatization would prove politically difficult, its intended effects in terms of efficiency of management were often achieved by opening up entry by private firms into sectors hitherto reserved for public sector enterprises: the entry of these firms, plus unwillingness to provide ever more subsidies to absorb losses, was like a pincer movement that meant: shape up or ship out.

I remember how, on a flight of Indian Airlines from Mumbai to Delhi, the stewardess had brought breakfast with the tea already made Indian-style: one part tea, four parts milk, and spoonfuls of sugar. When I complained, she answered: that is the way we serve tea (and, under her breath: if you do not like it, lump it).

After the growth of splendid new private-sector airlines such as Jet Airways and Kingfisher Airlines, Indian Airlines changed: competition mattered.

The old policy architecture could not be demolished in one fell swoop. The leadership had to negotiate minefields of ideological opposition, bureaucratic intransigence, and the lobbies (called ’interests’ by political scientists) that had fattened on the rents (i.e. monopoly profits) attending sheltered markets that they were earning.

The three I’s --- Ideas, Institutions and Interests --- of the old regime had to be confronted. Then, again, the post-1991 reformers felt that their task was akin to cleaning up after a tsunami. Hastening slowly was their only choice.

Still, as the reforms gathered steam, the effects on the growth rate were palpable. The growth rate, rising to roughly 6 per cent, nearly doubled in the 1990s and increased still further in the next decade and has recently been close to 9 per cent.

The sense that India was now an ’emerging superpower’ was a heady experience for Indian elites who had seen their country marginalized by policies that had become a laughing stock in the world while smaller nations in the Far East had emerged as the much-admired star performers.

The poor and the underprivileged have also benefited. But are the opponents of the reforms right to complain that the reformers have been focused on growth to the neglect of the underprivileged; and that the latter have been bypassed or immiserized?

It has become fashionable to say that this must be so because the Human Development Index, produced by the UNDP, puts India at the bottom, at 135th rank, in 1994.

But this is a nonsensical index which reduces, without scientifically plausible weights, several non-commensurate elements like literacy and health measures to a single number.

It is a fine example of how bad science gains traction because of endless repetition by the media: it must be dismissed as rubbish.

There is no substitute for hard, scientific answers to the questions concerning what has happened, during the period of reforms and enhanced growth, to the poor and the underprivileged: and these answers, as I will presently sketch, are more benign.

To begin with, however, let me remind you that the common criticism that Indian policy was interested in growth for itself is not even true if we go back to the early 1950s when planning took formal shape.

In fact, my first job in the Indian Planning Commission half a century ago was to devise a strategy to bring the bottom 30 per cent of India’s poor above the poverty line so they would enjoy a ’minimum standard of living’; and we came to the view, often expressed by the leaders of the Independence movement, that we had to grow the pie to do so: redistributing wealth in a country with ’many exploited and few exploiters’ as the visiting Marxist economist Kalecki put it graphically in 1962, was not a strategy that could produce sustained impact on poverty.

Growth was therefore regarded as a principal ’instrument’, a strategy, for pulling the poor out of poverty through gainful employment, not as an end in itself.

Growth was seen as what I have called an activist, radical ’pull up’ strategy, not as a passive, conservative ’trickle down’ strategy, to reduce poverty.

The growth strategy to pull the poor up from poverty, however, did not work because growth itself did not materialize because of the counterproductive policy framework that I sketched above.

But now that growth has actually been produced by the post-1991 reforms, what can we say about the wisdom of the growth strategy? Let me sketch some of the studies that suggest an affirmative answer.

After a considerable debate, it is now generally accepted that the enhanced growth over nearly 25 years year was associated with lifting nearly 200 million of the extreme poor above the poverty line.

By contrast, consistent with commonsense, the preceding quarter century with abysmal growth rate witnessed no perceptible, beneficial impact on poverty.

Then again, at a narrower level, the political scientist Devesh Kapur and associates have studied the fortune of the Dalits (untouchables) in India’s most populous state, Uttar Pradesh, between 1990 and 2008, to find that 61 per cent of those surveyed in the east and 38 per cent in the west said that their food and clothing situation was ’much better’.

Most striking is the finding of the political scientists Al Stepan and Yogendra Yadav, drawing on polling data produced by the Center for the Study of Developing Societies in Delhi, that for every disadvantaged group including women, the response to the question ’Has your financial situation improved, worsened, or has remained the same’ posed in 1996 and again in 2004, shows that every group has overwhelmingly remained the same or improved: those who claim to have worsened are invariably less than 25 per cent of the respondents.

As for the relative economic outcomes of the disadvantaged groups, the economist Amartya Lahiri and associates have studied India’s ’scheduled castes’ and ’scheduled tribes’, two particularly disadvantaged categories, and conclude that the last twenty years of major reforms ’have seen a sharp improvement in [their] relative economic fortunes’.

Then again, using household expenditure data for 1988 and 2004, the Johns Hopkins economists Pravin Krishna and Guru Sethupathy conclude that inequality, using a well-known measure invented by the Dutch econometrician Henri Theil, while showing initial rise, had fallen by 2004 back to the 1988 levels: a straight rise in inequality cannot be asserted.

I should also add that many reforms help the poor more than the rich because the rich can cope with the results of inefficient policies better than the poor.

If the public sector generation and distribution of electricity is inefficient, and the electricity goes off in the middle of the night in Delhi’s summer, the rich turn on their private generators and their air-conditioners continue working.

But the poor man on his charpoy swelters as his small Usha fan is not working. Those who object to letting in Coke and Pepsi forget that the common man derives his caffeine from these drinks while the well-off critics get theirs from the Espresso and Cappuccino coffee in the cafes.

The most interesting political implication of the success in finally denting poverty significantly, though nowhere enough, is that poverty is now seen by India’s poor and underprivileged to be removable.

India is witness finally to what I have called the Revolution of Perceived Possibilities. Aroused economic aspirations for betterment have led to political demands for the politicians to deliver yet more.

This suggests, as my Columbia University colleague Arvind Panagariya and I have hypothesized, that voters will look to vote for the politicians who can deliver growth, so that we would expect growth before the vote to be correlated with vote now.

In an important paper, Poonam Gupta and Panagariya have recently tested for this hypothesis and indeed found that it works. So, this implies that politicians should be looking to augment reforms, not reverse them as misguided anti-reform critics urge.

So, politicians would do well to strengthen the conventional reforms, which I call Stage 1 reforms, by extending them to the unfinished reform agenda of the early 1990s.

In particular, further liberalization of trade in all sectors, substantial freeing up of the retail sector and virtually all labour market reforms are still pending. Such intensification and broadening of Stage 1 reforms can only add to the good that these reforms do for the poor and the underprivileged.

But these conventional reforms have also generated revenues which can finally be spent on targeted health and education so as to additionally improve the well-being of the poor: these are what I call Stage 2 reforms.

When ’progressive’ critics argue that Stage 2 reforms must replace Stage 1 reforms, because they appear superficially to be more pro-poor, they forget that Stage 2 reforms have been made possible only because Stage 1 reforms have been undertaken.

How to get the most bang for the buck from programmes under Stage 2 reforms is where we have to turning our attention as well. As it happens, Stage 2 reforms involve ’social engineering’ and are inherently more difficult than Stage 1 reforms.

Thus, except for political difficulties, it is easy to reduce trade barriers: you just slash them. But if you want to improve education, for example, you have to worry about the best classroom size, the issue of teacher absenteeism, the question of how to get poor children to the school when their parents might want to have them work instead, whether you want to use school vouchers, and so on.

There is little doubt however that, once we have put our minds to work and our shoulders to the wheel, we will move ahead on both Stage 1 and Stage 2 reforms.

Many of the reforms require good governance and indeed necessitate a role for the government in some areas (in the appropriate provision of health, for instance) even as they require withdrawal of the government from others (as with inappropriate labour laws). Can we do this?

It is easy to get despondent today about the deterioration in governance because many seem to surrender much too easily to the notion that we have become hugely corrupt and that this is irretrievably so.

Thus, Transparency International’s index of corruption ranks us high on corruption. However, this index is wholly arbitrary, depending on subjective evaluation of the chosen respondents.

But in India, public figures are considered to be corrupt unless they prove to you otherwise. A blind man will tell you how he saw ’with his own eyes’ a bribe being given and accepted!

A most distinguished Indian bureaucrat once told me that his mother said to him: ’I believe you are not corrupt only because you are my son’.

Equally, it is wrong to think that we cannot think of institutional reforms that can reduce the corruption we do have. The abolition of the permit raj, of course, eliminated that important source of corruption.

But that also means that we have removed from our system the way in which politicians could raise money for their campaigns which, while not as expensive as in America, are still large enough to matter.

This means that other forms of corrupt ways of raising political funds have proliferated. We need therefore legal ways to raise campaign finance. Americans have done this; we need to do so as well.

Then again, we can use science to get at corruption in several areas. Thus, Nandan Nilekani is engaged in arguably the most important innovative reform in recent years by creating a national database of identity details of Indian citizens.

This should take the political corruption out of the Public Distribution System and in the Employment Guarantee Scheme, for instance, and will also reduce bureaucratic corruption by bypassing the low-level bureaucrats who refuse to give you what you need unless you grease their palms.

In fact, what Nilekani is doing additionally is demonstrating anew how science is integral to our assault on poverty and other ills in our society. The enormous potential of science is variously manifested.

To take just three examples:

1. The invention of the cheap laptop by Media Lab at MIT and later by Intel, has almost made it possible financially to put a laptop into every lap;

2. The latest invention of Embrace baby warmers for the millions of premature and low-birth-weight babies born each year; these are slated to sell at a price that is 1% of the traditional incubator; and

3. The invention of BT Brinjal and other GM crops makes it possible to have a second round of the Green Revolution that we need so badly if we are to increase productivity in agriculture; but the government has to deploy scientific evidence and argumentation against the naysayers who have objected to these as Frankenstein foods and instead have been allowed to halt their use on flimsy, virtually unscientific grounds including assertions of ’agricultural suicides’ that have been exposed often as unrelated deaths.


Perhaps we need to recall what Prime Minister Nehru said eloquently: ’It is science alone that can solve the problems of hunger and poverty, of insanitation and illiteracy, of superstition and deadening of custom and tradition, of vast resources running to waste, of a rich country inhabited by starving poor. Who indeed can afford to ignore science today? At every turn, we have to seek its aid. The future belongs to science and those who make friends with science.’

Reflection on what I have said today should provide the agenda that the impressive young Members of the Lok Sabha, who clearly seek new perspectives and aim to accept fresh challenges, can embrace to take India to what Jawaharlal Nehru called our ’tryst with destiny’.

After sixty years of Independence, surely it is high time for his vision to turn into reality.

Sunday, February 13, 2011

A Must Watch

http://www.facebook.com/video/video.php?v=781884994041

Saturday, February 12, 2011

Industry output falls to 1.6%, a 20-month low

Hindustan Times
New Delhi, February 11, 2011
India's industrial production growth fell to 1.6% in December, the slowest in 20 months from 3.6 % in the previous month adding another set of worries to government's macro economic managers who are grappling for options to sustain growth and keep prices under check. Finance minister Pranab
Mukherjee termed the latest factory output growth data as "disappointing" but added that monthly data do not reflect the correct picture of the overall economy.

"IIP numbers are very unfortunate and it is disappointing but it was on expected lines as it was on yearly basis," Mukherjee said.

"Monthly and weekly numbers do not reflect correct picture. Therefore you shall have to take the whole year into account. Let us see how it reflects in the annual picture," the finance minister added.

Manufacturing output, which accounts for about 80 % of the industrial production, grew by 1 % in December.

Capital goods output contracted 13.7 % in December in a sign that higher cost of credit and rising input cost pressures may have forced companies to defer planned investments.

Industry captains said any further rise in interest rates would deepen deceleration in manufacturing.

"That the growth of the manufacturing sector is moderating as is evident from the fact that machinery and equipment segment has witnessed a negative growth of 12.8% in December. In the light of this sharp decline, we add a cautionary note on further tightening of monetary policy and exit from the stimulus," said Rajan Bharti Mittal, president of industry chamber Ficci.


The RBI has raised key policy rates seven times so far in 2010-11 to cool prices as as food prices raced into high-double digits pummelled by a supply crunch of staple vegetables.

Last month, RBI maintained the repo and reverse repo rates at 6.5 % and 5.5 % respectively.

A higher repo, the rate at which RBI lends to lenders, raises the banks' borrowing costs prompting them to raise interest rates for final home, auto and corporate borrowers.

A higher reverse repo—the rate at which RBI absorbs excess cash ---means it would suck cash from the system to stymie demand and cool prices.